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APPLYING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT'S
PRIVACY EXEMPTION TO REQUESTS FOR LISTS
OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA" or the "Act")1 recognizes
both the value of providing public access to government information and
the need to protect the privacy of individual citizens.2 The Act requires
federal agencies to release requested information contained in agency
files, but also specifies nine exemptions that allow the government to
withhold the records. FOIA's sixth exemption limits disclosure of "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."4
There is conflict concerning the weight of the privacy interest in names
and addresses under exemption six.5 Some courts have held that disclo-
sure of lists of names and addresses contained in files held by a federal
agency constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
and that the agency could choose not to release such information.6
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
3. FOIA states, in part:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(3) [E]ach agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes
such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules ... shall make
the records promptly available to any person.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(d) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b)(6), (d) (1988).
The FOIA exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979). Therefore, a federal agency may choose to release
information that is exempted from disclosure. See id. For a general discussion of private
individuals' ability to prevent government officials from releasing exempted information,
see Silver, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation in a Non-Commercial Setting:
The Case of Professor Doe, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 455 (1982).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
5. See United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 598 v. Department of the Army, 841 F.2d
1459, 1465 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (Skopil, J., concurring) ("[Tihis court has recognized a
privacy interest in names and addresses but has left unclear the extent of the interest....
Courts elsewhere have taken a more decided view. The circuits conflict over the weight
of the privacy interest in names and addresses." (citations omitted)).
6. See, ag., National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873(D.C. Cir. 1989) (organization operating to protect interests of retired federal employees
held not entitled to list of names and addresses of retired or disabled federal employees),
cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098); Minnis v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1984) (owner of lodge on scenic river may
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Other courts reviewing denials of similar FOIA requests have held that
the agency must release lists of names and addresses.7
This Note examines whether an individual's name or address should
be released from a government file pursuant to a disclosure request under
the Freedom of Information Act. Part I discusses the legislative history
of FOIA and judicial interpretation of the purposes and application of
the Act. Part H identifies specific issues that have divided circuit courts
in their application of exemption six in general and their analysis of the
privacy interest in one's name and address in particular.
In Part III, this Note suggests that in reviewing a federal agency's
denial of a request for names and addresses under the privacy exemption
balancing test, courts should first identify the public interest in disclo-
sure. This public interest should be limited to disclosures that allow pub-
lie scrutiny of the operation of government and its agents. Next, the
court should identify the private citizen's interest in non-disclosure and
examine the potential impact of release of a name and address to the
public. This Note concludes that denial of release would be proper if
disclosure would reveal embarrassing or intimate personal details per-
taining to an individual or would facilitate intrusion upon an individual's
privacy through unrequested mail or telephone solicitations without fur-
thering FOIA's intended public interest purpose.
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT
A. Historical Perspective and the Legislative Purpose
FOIA was enacted in 19668 to ensure greater public access to govern-
not obtain names and addresses of those who applied for permits to travel on the river),
cer denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin.,
732 F.2d 526 (6th Cir.) (umbrella organization of civic, religious and educational groups
could not obtain addresses of those obtaining home financing through VA in order to
determine whether blacks and whites were intentionally being segregated), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1034 (1984); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United States
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983) (union may not receive
names and addresses of employees in representative unit); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS,
502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974) (distributor of home winemaking equipment may not obtain
release of names and addresses of persons who filed form with United States Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to permit them to produce wine for use at home without
paying tax).
7. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.) (union
may receive list of names and addresses of employees in representative unit), cert dis-
missed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d
229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988) (same); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1988) (same, adding that disclosure would be prohib-
ited if employee specifically asked employer not to release name or address), vacated, 109
S. Ct. 831, dismissed as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (law professors entitled to names and addresses of employees eligible
to vote in representation elections to study utility of NLRB regulations governing parties'
behavior during the elections).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
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ment information.9 The Act amended section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"),'0 the original government information disclo-
sure statute.I1 Section 3 of the APA "was generally recognized as falling
short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a with-
holding statute than a disclosure statute."12 Both the House and Senate
Reports accompanying the bill that became FOIA expressed the senti-
ment that section 3 of the APA was poorly drafted and had not met its
goals.1 3
FOTA was intended to permit public access to government information
in order to facilitate public scrutiny of agency action. 14 The Act is also
9. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter Senate Report].
10. 5. U.S.C. § 1002 (1946), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
11. Section 3 of the APA stated, in part:
Except to the extent there is involved (1) any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest ....
(c) Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in ac-
cordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly
concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.
5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1946).
12. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
13. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2418, 2421 [hereinafter House Re-
port]; see also 110 Cong. Rec. 17,088 (1964) (comments of Senator Dirksen on S. 1666)
(referring to "[r]efusal on top of refusal of Government agencies and departments to
make available to the public that information which affects the public").
One of the loopholes employed by federal officials to deny requests for information was
the exemption of "any function requiring secrecy in the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 1002
(1946). "There is no attempt in the bill or its legislative history to delimit 'in the public
interest,' and there is no authority granted for any review of the use of this vague phrase
by Federal officials who wish to to withhold information." Senate Report, supra note 9,
at 5; accord House Report, supra, at 5. Furthermore, section 3 of the APA provided that
public records must be made available "to persons properly and directly concerned ex-
cept information held confidential for good cause found." 5 U.S.C. § 1002(3)(c) (1946).
This "double-barreled loophole," did not define "for good cause found" and provided
government officials the excuse that the party requesting the information was not "prop-
erly directed and concerned." See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5. Government officials
would often interpret these vague provisions to withhold information in order to cover up
embarrassing mistakes. See id. at 3.
As a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that section 3 of the APA is "of
little or no value to the public in gaining access to records of the Federal Government."
Id. at 5. Reaching the same conclusion, the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions stated, "[i]n fact, section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act has become the
major statutory excuse for withholding Government records from public view." House
Report, supra, at 3.
14. See, eg., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("The
basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors ac-
countable to the governed."); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361(1975) (FOIA designed "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny.") (citation omitted); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80(1973) (same, adding that Act "attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to
secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands"); Senate Report, supra
note 9, at 3 (same).
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designed to assist private citizens in their dealings with federal agen-
cies.15 FOIA's purpose, however, "is not fostered by disclosure of infor-
mation about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's
own conduct." 16 The Act "was not intended to function as a private
discovery tool,"17 nor was it intended to assist private individuals in the
furtherance of their commercial interests or endeavors.18
FOIA requires that requested information be released unless it falls
within one of the statutory exemptions. 19 The exemptions are designed
to establish concrete, workable standards for determining whether partic-
ular material may be withheld or must be disclosed.2" These limited ex-
emptions, however, are not to obscure the Act's basic policy favoring
disclosure.2x
B. The Privacy Exemption
FOIA's privacy exemption limits disclosures of "personnel and medi-
cal files and similar files" where disclosure "would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."22 The exemption provides
private citizens statutory2' protection from unwanted intrusions upon
15. See infra note 50.
16. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109
S. CL 1468, 1481 (1989).
17. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (emphasis in
original); accord Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 417 F. Supp.
651, 655 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977).
18. See Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d
Cir. 1974). But see Consumers Union of the United States v. Veterans Admin., 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (publisher of magazine obtained records of VA hearing aid
test program to inform its readers which hearing aids worked best), dismissed as moot,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
19. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,221 (1978); Department
of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976).
20. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
21. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
23. The protection of FOLA's privacy exemption is not a constitutionally based right
of privacy. The Supreme Court has noted that aconstitutional right of privacy in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters is sometimes recognized. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598-99 & n.25 (1977) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)). A right of privacy in information provided to a
federal agency, however, is not included in that constitutionally protected zone. Cf
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. Ct.
1468, 1476-77 (1989) (discussing privacy interest in personal information included in
agency file without recognizing constitutional privacy protection).
Similarly, although private tort law sometimes recognizes a cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy, nothing in the legislative history of FOIA indicates that Congress relied
on private tort law in formulating the protection of exemption six. See Kronman, The
Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. Legal Stud. 727, 738 n.40
(1980). In analyzing FOIA's privacy protections, the Supreme Court referred to the
common law and literal understandings of "privacy," which include an interest of an
individual in controlling information concerning his or her person. See Reporters Comm,
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their personal privacy resulting from government disclosure of their af-
fairs to third parties.24 Congress' primary concern in drafting exemption
six was to ensure the confidentiality of personal matters."
Based upon statements in the House and Senate Reports,26 the
Supreme Court has held that exemption six requires a balancing of the
public interest in disclosure with the private interest in non-disclosure.2
Congress recognized that federal agencies, in compiling various records,
acquire an abundance of personal information about private individu-
als.28 The privacy exemption was added to FOIA to provide for a bal-
ancing of the individual's right of privacy and the public's right to
governmental information. 29
109 S. Ct. at 1476-77. The Court did not suggest, however, that the statute merely codi-
fied the common-law tort into FOIA's privacy exemption. See id.
24. "Privacy" may be understood as denoting a condition of limited access to one's
affairs, experiences and engagements. See D. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, ind Public Policy
16 (1979). This condition may be disturbed when personal information, disclosed by an
individual to a governmental agency, is released to some third party. See id. at 18. This
notion of privacy includes freedom from unwanted intrusions and disclosures of personal
affairs as well as the freedom to limit one's engagements with others. See !d at 16.
25. See United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599-600
(1982).
26. The Senate Report states, in part:
At the same time that abroad philosophy of 'freedom of information' is enacted
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy
with respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and
personnel records.... It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests,
but it is not an impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to
protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or
substantially subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable formula which
encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure.
Senate Report, supra note 9, at 3. Similarly, the House Report states, in part:
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right of the
public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in confi-
dence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy. The
right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is operating
can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his right to confide in
his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering all these interests.
House Report, supra note 13, at 6.
27. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1976).
The Supreme Court in Rose implicitly rejected a then-existing minority view eschewing
the need to balance interests under the privacy exemption. The court in Robles v. EPA,
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973), stated that "the right to disclosure under the Act is not to
be resolved by a balancing of equities or a weighing of need or even benefit." Id. at 848.
The statute calls for disclosure to "any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988). Balancing
under the privacy exemption would be improper, according to that minority view, be-
cause "[a]ll parties are equal in satisfying the words 'any person." Robles, 484 F.2d at
847 n.6, (quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.4, at 121 (Supp. 1970)).
But see 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5:6, at 320-21 (2d ed. 1978) (following
Rose to require balancing interests under exemption six).
28. See House Report, supra note 13, at 11.
29. The Senate Report states, in part:
Such agencies as the Veterans' Administration, Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, Selective Service, etc., have great quantities of files, the confi-
1037
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I. IssuEs DISPUTED IN APPLICATION OF PRIVACY EXEMPTION TO
REQUESTS FOR NAMES AND ADDRESSES
There are five principal disputes among the circuit courts concerning
application of the privacy exemption balancing test to requests for names
and addresses. The first area of discrepancy is whether to consider the
availability of alternative sources of information. Some courts, ignoring
this factor, identify the privacy interest at stake, specify the public inter-
est in disclosure, and consider whether public access to the information
would constitute an invasion of privacy.30 If disclosure would constitute
such an invasion, they consider only whether such an invasion is justified
by any countervailing benefit from disclosure.3" Others, however, also
consider the availability of alternative sources of information under the
privacy exemption balancing test.
32
dentiality of which has been maintained by agency rule but without statutory
authority. There is a consensus that these files should not be opened to the
public, and the committee decided upon a general exemption rather than a
number of specific statutory authorizations for various agencies. It is believed
that the scope of the exemption is held within bounds by the use of the limita-
tion of 'a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'
The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a
policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an
individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preserva-
tion of the public's right to governmental information.
Senate Report, supra note 9, at 9.
The House Report states, in part:
The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' provides
a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and
the preservation of the public's right to Government information by excluding
those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual. The
exemption is also intended to cover detailed Government records on an individ-
ual which can be identified as applying to that individual and not the facts con-
cerning the award of a pension or benefit or the compilation of unidentified
statistical information from personal records.
House Report, supra note 13, at 11.
30. See Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526, 529 (6th
Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 261-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wine Hobby USA, Inc.
v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974).
31. See Heights, 732 F.2d at 529; Washington Post, 690 F.2d at 265; Wine Hobby, 502
F.2d at 137.
32. See, e.g, Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.
1984) (court sets out four factors to be balanced in weighing a claim of exemption:
1) plaintiff's interest in disclosure; 2) public interest in disclosure; 3) degree of invasion of
privacy; 4) availability of any alternative means of obtaining requested information), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army,
611 F.2d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The District Judge should also consider any
alternative sources of information which might be available."); Getman v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 670, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("lilt is also significant that... appellees have no other
source for obtaining the names and addresses .... "). But see National Ass'n of Retired
Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (not mentioning alternative
availability as a factor), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-
1098).
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The second issue in dispute is whether courts, in analyzing the inva-
sion of personal privacy, should examine only the effect of releasing
harmful or embarrassing facts, or whether they should also consider less
immediate invasions such as receiving a barrage of mail solicitations.
Some hold that exemption six only excludes from disclosure details that
are of an "intimate" or "highly personal" nature.33 Most courts, how-
ever, will also consider the effects of release beyond the disclosure of inti-
mate or highly embarrassing details.34
The third source of controversy is whether the private interest of the
requester is relevant to the exemption six balancing test. The Ninth Cir-
cuit considers both the requesting party's particular interest as well as
any general public interest in obtaining disclosure.3" Other courts con-
sider only the general public's interest in release of the information. 36
According to these courts, weighing the requesting party's interest is im-
proper, because a court cannot limit the disclosure of information to par-
ticular parties for particular uses.37 Furthermore, because FOIA
mandates that "any person"' 38 may obtain the information, either all re-
questers must have access to the information or none will; the special
needs of any individual submitting the requesters should be irrelevant.39
Similarly, some circuit courts have relied on Supreme Court statements
33. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554,556
(2d Cir. 1986) (citing Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981); Getman, 450 F.2d at
675.
34. See, eg., Homer, 879 F.2d at 876 (list indicates that individual receives monthly
annuity check from federal government, transforming recipient into potential target of
barrage of unwanted solicitations); Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784,
787 (9th Cir. 1984) (disclosure would also reveal personal interests in water sports and
the out-of-doors, which could subject applicants to unwanted barrage of mailings and
personal solicitations), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Heights Community Congress
v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526, 530 (6th Cir.) (release would subject a veteran to
involuntary personal involvement in investigation of racial steering), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1034 (1984); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United States
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983) (disclosure could
subject the employees to an unchecked barrage of mailings and personal solicitations);
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974) (disclosure will not only
subject registrant to unsolicited, possibly unwanted mail, but also reveal information re-
garding registrant's in-home personal activities, family status and whether registrant lives
alone).
35. See Minnis, 737 F.2d at 786; Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 746.
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia assumed that only the
requesting party will receive the material and that it will not be released to any other
member of the general public. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1971). That court, therefore, considered only the requesting party's interest in disclosure.
See id. Subsequent decisions of this court, however, rejected this assumption. See
Homer, 879 F.2d at 877; Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 258-59 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
36. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs.; 712 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983); United States Dep't of the
Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988).
37. See Homer, 879 F.2d at 875; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 712 F.2d at 932.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988).
39. See Dep't of Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d at 233.
1990] 1039
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regarding FOIA's fifth and seventh exemptions' to hold that the identity
of the requesting party has no bearing on the privacy exemption balanc-
ing test.41 Requesters' arguments that their planned use would not lead
to a privacy invasion are considered irrelevant because the impact of dis-
closure to the general public is examined.42
There is also disagreement as to what constitutes a "public interest in
disclosure" under the privacy exemption. One view holds that there is a
public interest in disclosure if release of the requested information would
serve the core purpose of FOIA: to enlighten the public about the work-
ings of the government.43 Others adopt a broader view of "public inter-
est in disclosure."' 44 These courts will sometimes find a public interest in
disclosure when release would serve the public good, but not further
40. FOIA's fifth and seventh exemptions exclude from disclosure certain agency
memorandums and law enforcement records, described as follows:
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confiden-
tial source including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case
of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful na-
tional security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential
source, (B) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement in-
vestigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement
investigation or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to
risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger
the life or physical safety of any individual[.]
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (7) (1988).
41. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 875
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1480 (1989)) (Supreme Court's assessment of public
interest in disclosure under FOIA's seventh exemption relied on to conclude that re-
quester's identity should also be irrelevant under privacy exemption test), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098); Washington Post Co. v. United States
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 258-59 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (relying
on NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975)) (Supreme Court's
determination that FOIA requesters identity irrelevant under exemption five relied on in
privacy exemption analysis).
42. See Homer, 879 F.2d at 875.
43. See Id, at 878-79; see also Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th
Cir. 1989) (recognizing public interest in disclosure under exemption seven only where
release informs citizenry about government's activity).
44. See United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir.), cert
dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d
229, 233 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); United States Dep't of Agric. v.
FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 831, dismissed as moot,
876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989); see also 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5:7, at
324 (2d ed. 1978) (because individual members of public are included in "the public" to
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FOTA's purposes of revealing information about the operation of govern-
ment.45 Finally, courts are divided regarding the nature and extent of
the privacy interest in one's name and address. Some courts recognize a
strong privacy interest in names and addresses.46 Others, while recogniz-
ing a "meaningful" or "cognizable" privacy interest in one's name and
address,47 allow release of the requested list if there is a stronger public
interest in disclosure. 48 A third position is that the privacy interest one
has in his name and home address is minimal or negligible.4 9
whom 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) mandates disclosure, their interests should also be taken into
account).
45. For example, when a union requests lists of names and addresses of employees of
the bargaining unit it represents, the employer argues that the "public interest" is limited
to an interest of or benefit to the public concerning the operation or conduct of the gov-
ernment. See Dept of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d at 1136. Courts often reject this argu-
ment, relying on Congress' view articulated in the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1988), that the public interest is served by collective bargaining
on behalf of government employees. See Dept of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d at 1134-35;
USDA v. FLRA, 836 F.2d at 1143; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v.
FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1986).
Subsequent to these circuit court decisions requiring disclosure of employees' names
and addresses to the unions, regulations promulgated by the United States Department of
Agriculture and the United States Defense Mapping Agency required disclosure of the
names and home addresses of employees to the unions representing them. See 53 Fed.
Reg. 44,513 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 39,629 (1988).
In United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129, 1134-35
(4th Cir. 1987), cert dismised, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988), the court did not follow the previ-
ous Fourth Circuit holding in American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983), that release of
employees' names and addresses to a union would constitute a privacy invasion. The
court in Dept ofHHS v. FLRA emphasized that it was not reviewing a denial of a FOIA
request and deferred to the FLRA's determination that disclosure was required under the
Federal Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7107-7135 (1988). See Dep't of
HHS v. FLRA, 833 F.2d at 1335.
46. See, eg., National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 875
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (privacy interest of individual in avoiding unlimited disclosure of name
and address is significant), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-
1098); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136-137 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[Tjhere are
few things which pertain to an individual in which his privacy has traditionally been
more respected than his own home.").
47. See, eg., Dept ofNavy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d at 1136 ("mhis court's case law recog-
nizes that individuals generally have a meaningful interest in the privacy of information
concerning their homes which merits some protection." (citations omitted)); USDA v.
FLRA, 836 F.2d at 1143 ("Thus, we conclude that employees have a cognizable privacy
interest in their home addresses.").
48. See United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); United States Dep't of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139,
1144 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 831, dismissed as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1989).
49. See, e.g., United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 232 (7th
Cir.) ("It is hard to see how the disclosure of home addresses could be 'clearly unwar-
ranted' as a rule."), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[The privacy inter-
est of the average employee in his address is not particularly compelling."); Van Bourg,
Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 728 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]his inva-
sion is minimal"), vacated, 756 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished opinion); Getman
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III. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY EXEMPTION
BALANCING TEST
Disclosure of government information to the public is necessary to
maintain the democratic nature of our society. 0 There is also a need to
protect the privacy of individuals who confide in their government.51
Federal agencies have accumulated vast amounts of information that in-
clude private facts about individuals.52 Disclosure of such personal in-
formation would not only constitute an invasion of privacy, but would
also deter individuals from providing the government with similar infor-
mation in the future.
Congress' intention that application of the privacy exemption entail a
balancing of the public interest in disclosure and the private interest in
non-disclosure is clear from the legislative history, as the Supreme Court
has confirmed.53 No bright-line rule is applicable to every consideration
of the privacy interest in one's name and address under exemption six.
Congress recognized this when it granted district courts jurisdiction to
review de novo an administrative agency's decision to deny a FOIA re-
quest and withhold information from the public.5 4 Nevertheless, general
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The giving of names and addresses is a
very much lower degree of disclosure").
50. See 110 Cong. Rec. 17,087 (1964) (remarks of Senator Long introducing S. 1666,
a predecessor bill of FOIA).
Revealing administrative policies and procedures as well as the activities and decision-
making of governmental agencies to the general public helps to eliminate any possibility
of secret government, real or imagined. See id. This enhances the public's trust of and
confidence in its government. See li Responsible and efficient behavior of government
officials is promoted by such disclosure. See Kronman, supra note 23, at 733.
Public disclosure also enables citizens to make informed judgments concerning the per-
formance of their elected officials. "We must remove every barrier to information
about-and understanding of-Government activities consistent with our security if the
American public is to be adequately equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of
responsible citizenship." 112 Cong. Rec. 13,641 (1966) (Representative Moss, Chairman
of the House Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information and a key
sponsor of S. 1160, the bill that became FOIA).
Finally, disclosing government regulations and other information assists individuals in
their dealings with administrative agencies.
This legislation which we have before us now is of the greatest importance be-
cause fair and just administrative proceedings require, first of all, that the peo-
ple know not only what the statutory law is, but what the administrative rules
and regulations are, where to go, who to see, what is required and how they
must present their matter. They must be informed in advance about the deci-
sions which the administrative agencies and departments may use as precedent
in determining their matter ....
110 Cong. Rec. 17,088 (1964) (comments of Senator Dirksen on S. 1666).
51. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 3. The Senate Report states: "At the same
time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' is enacted into law, it is neces-
sary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain infor-
mation in Government files, such as medical and personnel records." Id.
52. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977); House Report, supra note 13, at 11.
53. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
54. The statute states, in part:
On complaint, the district court of the United States... has jurisdiction to
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guidelines must be established so that such denials are reviewed
consistently.
A. Alternative Sources Irrelevant
In balancing the public interest in disclosure with the private interest
in non-disclosure, courts should not take into account availability of the
names and addresses from other sources." Consideration of this factor
supports conflicting conclusions. On the one hand, alternative availabil-
ity of information might favor disclosure because release of the list will
not significantly contribute to an invasion of personal privacy.56 Any
potential privacy invasion would, in all likelihood, already have occurred
as a result of that alternative availability. At the same time, however, if
alternative sources are not available, one could argue for release, in cer-
tain circumstances, because the requested information is necessary to ad-
vance the public interest purpose for which it is sought.57
Furthermore, consideration of alternative availability distracts the fo-
cus of the inquiry away from the primary balancing under FOIA-the
invasion of privacy with the public's right to government information.
The significance of alternative availability as a factor in the balancing test
is lessened when there is no discernible public benefit from disclosure. 5s
In addition, disclosure of names and addresses is not warranted if such
release would result in a significant invasion of personal privacy, even
when there is no alternative source for the list. The important issues in
the balancing test, therefore, are the public benefit from disclosure and
the personal privacy of the individual. Alternative sources, in compari-
son, are largely irrelevant to this assessment. Similar arguments support
the conclusion that alternative methods of communication are also irrele-
vant to the privacy exemption balancing test.5 9
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production
of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a
case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the con-
tents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or
any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
55. See, eg., Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526, 529(6th Cir.) (describing balancing test without referring to alternative means as a factor),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d
Cir. 1974) (same).
56. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690
F.2d 252, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
57. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
58. See Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
59. Some courts inquired into alternative methods of communication with those
whom the requester desired to contact. See Minnis, 737 F.2d at 786-88; American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712
F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983). The presence of an alternative method of communication,
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B. Protection from Unwanted Intrusions of Solicitation
Congress undoubtedly sought, through exemption six, to prevent inva-
sions of personal privacy that would result from the disclosure of "inti-
mate" or "highly personal"'" details about an individual. The privacy
interest in controlling release of intimate or highly personal information
is compelling. Most courts, however, have recognized that Congress pro-
vided protection against other types of intrusion in the privacy exemp-
tion;62 the exemption also protects against significant but less severe
invasions of privacy that are facilitated by the FOIA disclosure, such as
unwanted intrusions of mailed solicitations.63
Those arguing that the privacy exemption does not protect against
such intrusions might stress that only "clearly unwarranted" invasions of
personal privacy are excepted." Before the Act was passed, Congress
was urged to revise the language of the exemption to broaden the scope
of its protection.6' That these proposals were ignored suggests that Con-
gress intended to restrict only release of harmful or embarrassing facts.
The Second Circuit stated that exemption six protects against disclo-
sure of facts that "could subject the person to whom they pertain to em-
like the availability of alternative sources, should not be a substantial factor under exemp-
tion six. To compel disclosure all that is needed is a legitimate public interest in disclo-
sure that is not outweighed by an individual's privacy interest. Any alternative method
of communication is, therefore, irrelevant. See United States Dep't of the Air Force v.
FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988). Furthermore,
alternative means of communication are sometimes frustrated by the party attempting to
prevent disclosure. For example, one court justified denial of disclosure based upon alter-
native methods of communication available to a union despite deliberate acts by the em-
ployer to thwart the union's attempts to use those methods to reach the employees. See
American Fed'n v. Dep't of HHS, 712 F.2d at 932.
60. House Report, supra note 13, at 11.
61. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 9.
62. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
63. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 876-78
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098);
Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526,
529 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
64. See United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir.),
cert dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988).
65. See Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758 and S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1965) (William Feldesman, solicitor for NLRB, urging deletion of
"clearly unwarranted" because it would be unduly restrictive) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings]; Hearings on H.R. 5012, H.R. 5013, H.R. 5014, H.R. 5015, H.R. 5016, H.R. 5017,
H.R. 5018, H.R. 5019, H.R. 5020, H.R. 5021, H.R. 5237, H.R. 5406, H.R. 5520, H.R.
5583, H.R. 6172, H.R. 6739, H.R. 7010, H.R. 7161 Before the Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1965) (same) [hereinafter House Hearings]; see also Sen-
ate Hearings, supra, at 36 (Edwin F. Rains, Assistant General Counsel of Treasury
Department, urging that "clearly" be stricken); House Hearings, supra, at 230 (Fred B.
Smith, Acting General Counsel of Treasury Department, making same
recommendation).
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barrassment, harassment, disgrace, loss of employment or friends." '66
Whether disclosure of information results in a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy, the court reasoned, is closely related to whether
the information is "similar" to medical or personnel files.67 In the
court's opinion, whether the information is similar to that contained in
medical and personnel files depends on the personal, intimate quality of
the information.68
The Supreme Court, however, subsequently defined "similar files"
broadly to include "'detailed Government records on an individual
which can be identified as applying to that individual.' 69 This defini-
tion undermines the Second Circuit's reasoning. Because "similar files"
has been defined broadly, any request for information that can be identi-
fied as pertaining to a particular person will trigger the exemption six
balancing test. Thus, information that is not intimate or highly personal
would be exempt from disclosure if the invasion of privacy outweighs the
public interest in disclosure.70
In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that individuals have a
cognizable interest in avoiding unwanted intrusions through the postal
system. 71 The Court stated that "a sufficient measure of individual au-
tonomy must survive to permit every householder to exercise control
over unwanted mail, ' 72 and that "[ihe ancient concept that 'a man's
home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none
of its vitality ... ,,73 Therefore, the privacy exemption protects individu-
als not only from more severe invasions resulting from disclosure of
highly personal or intimate details, but also from significant but less se-
vere intrusions resulting from unwanted solicitations. This shields pri-
vate citizens from commercial opportunists who target them based on
the knowledge gained by obtaining lists of names and addresses from
administrative agencies. 74
C. Peculiar Interest of Requester Irrelevant
The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress 'clearly intended' the
FOIA to 'give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as
66. Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)
(quoting House Report, supra note 13, at 11).
70. See id. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has incorrectly continued to hold that
exemption six only protects against disclosure of harmful or embarrassing facts. See
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554,556-57 (2d Cir.
1986).
71. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
72. Id. at 736.
73. Id. at 737.
74. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 878(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098).
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one with a special interest [in a particular document].' ""7 Although this
statement was made in reference to FOIA generally and not to the pri-
vacy exemption, courts can properly construe the Supreme Court's deci-
sions as encouraging a similar understanding of exemption six. 76
Any peculiar interest of the requester that is not shared with the gen-
eral public should not be considered a public interest under the privacy
exemption. In fact, courts have already recognized this principle in re-
fusing to recognize private commercial interests as justification for
release.77
The legislative history and language of FOIA also indicate that only
the interest of the entire public in disclosure is relevant to the exemption
six balancing test. Both the Senate and House Reports refer to the pub-
lic's right to government information.7 Furthermore, the statute itself
states that "[e]ach agency shall make available to the public informa-
tion" 79 and that "[elach agency, upon any request for records.., shall
make the records promptly available to any person." 80
Particular requesters might argue that their intended use would not
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."1 The requesters'
interest in disclosure, however, is also irrelevant to the judicial estimation
of the impact of disclosure on personal privacy."2 As a practical matter,
once a list of names and addresses is released, neither the federal agency
providing it nor the courts can effectively limit its circulation. 83 The im-
pact of general disclosure on privacy must be considered because a court
cannot limit the disclosure of records to particular parties for particular
75. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109
S. Ct. 1468, 1480-81 (1989) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149
n.10 (1975) (applying exemption five)).
76. See Homer, 879 F.2d at 875; Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't. of
Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 258-59 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
77. See Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d
Cir. 1974).
78. The Senate Report states that the exemption "will involve a balancing of interests
between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny
and the preservation of the public's right to governmental information." Senate Report,
supra note 9, at 9 (emphasis added). The Senate Report also states that "[flor the great
majority of different records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its govern-
ment is doing." Id at 5.
The House Report adds that FOIA "establishes the basic principle of a public records
law by making the records available to any person." House Report, supra note 13, at 8.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
81. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 875(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098).
82. See id.
83. Releasing a list of names and addresses with a limitation that it not be distributed
to any third party under penalty of contempt is not a viable option. A finding of con-
tempt upon such subsequent disclosure would not prevent an invasion of privacy; it
would only provide punishment for an invasion that already occurred.
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uses.
84
D. The Public Interest in Disclosure
Under the privacy exemption, disclosures that would invade personal
privacy are nevertheless required if there is a more powerful public inter-
est in disclosure. Disclosure is "in the public interest" under FOIA's
privacy exemption if it reveals something about the operation or conduct
of a government entity or one of its agents.ss While FOIA requires dis-
closure to "any person," 6 it is apparent from the legislative history and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that before disclosure is ordered, a
court must balance the public's need to know about its government with
the individual's right to privacy."7 Disclosures required by the balancing
test serve FOIA's purposes of ensuring the democratic nature of our gov-
ernment and assisting individuals in their dealings with administrative
agencies.88 Thus, the public interest in disclosure is served by the release
of information concerning the workings of government, such as adminis-
trative policies, procedures and decisionmaking.
According to this understanding of "public interest in disclosure," dis-
closure is not warranted when release of the list neither enlightens the
public about the workings of government nor assists individuals in their
dealings with federal agencies, but invites intrusions consisting of phone
or mail solicitations.8 9 Disclosure of names and addresses that facilitates
such intrusions is proper if that release also provides the public with in-
formation regarding government operations. For example, a release that
would uncover racial steering through a federally-insured loan program
is warranted, even though contact with private citizens would necessarily
result.' Similarly, FOIA requires release of employee names and ad-
84. See Homer, 879 F.2d at 875; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v.
United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983).
85. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 878-79(D.C. Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098); see
also Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989) (providing similar
assessment of public interest in disclosure under exemption seven).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988).
87. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 879(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098).
90. Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984), represents a classic situation in which disclosure would
facilitate mail or phone intrusions but would also reveal administrative practices. There,
local organizations sought, pursuant to FOIA, addresses of veterans obtaining home fi-
nancing through the Veterans Administration loan program in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.
See id. at 527-28. Those organizations wanted to investigate whether lenders and realtors
were manipulating the VA loan program to steer white and black veterans into separate
neighborhoods. See ia at 527. The Sixth Circuit upheld the VA's denial of release so as
to avoid a privacy invasion. See id. at 531. The decision appears inconsistent with the
purpose of FOIA. Disclosure would have enabled monitoring of a federally-insured loan
program to uncover any racial steering that might have occurred. Whether the VA
sought to detect such practices might also come to light. This would have fulfilled
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dresses to unions representing them in collective bargaining with federal
agency employers.91 Although this disclosure facilitates direct communi-
cation with the employees, release also serves FOLA's intended public
interest purpose.92
E. Privacy Interest in Name and Address Depends Upon Context
It is clear that Congress did not intend for FOIA to provide blanket
protection of the privacy in one's name in every situation.93 The House
Report cited the refusal of government agencies to release the names and
salaries of federal employees as one of the abuses that occurred under the
APA's third section.94
According to the Supreme Court, however, other portions of FOIA
FOIA's purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of agency action. See NLRB v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 361 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
91. See United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988); United States Dep't of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139,
1144 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 831, dismissed as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1989); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 557 (2d
Cir. 1986). But see FLRA v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1453
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990).
92. Courts ordering release in such cases sometimes recognize a public interest in
disclosure based on Congress' view, stated in the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1988), that collective bargaining in public employment is in the
public interest. See Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d at 1136; USDA v. FLRA, 836 F.2d
at 1143; American Fed'n v. FLRA, 786 F.2d at 557. While collective bargaining in federal
employment may serve the public good, this alone should not support a finding of a
public interest in disclosure under the balancing test. The privacy exemption will not
recognize a public interest in disclosure unless release would reveal information about the
operation of government or assist persons in their dealings with federal agencies. Disclo-
sure in these cases, however, would serve the public interest because it would assist un-
ions and the persons they represent in their dealings with federal agencies. Cf USDA v.
FLRA4, 836 F.2d at 1142 (disclosure would enable union to communicate with unit em-
ployees, assisting them in their representation of interests of all members of bargaining
unit); United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th
Cir. 1987) (release needed to facilitate communication between union and employees dur-
ing negotiations with federal employer as well as during periods between negotiations).
Release of the lists would facilitate communication between the unions and those they
represent; the unions will learn the views and concerns of the unit members and be able to
represent their interests more effectively in negotiations with federal agency employers.
See Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d at 1137; USDA v. FLRA, 836 F.2d at 1141-42.
93. See House Report, supra note 13, at 6.
94. See id The House Report states, in part:
The statutory requirement that information about routine administrative ac-
tions need be given only to 'persons properly and directly concerned' has been
relied upon almost daily to withhold Government information from the public.
A most striking example is the almost automatic refusal to disclose the names
and salaries of Federal employees. Shortly after World War II the western office
of a Federal regulatory agency refused to make available the names and salaries
of its administrative and supervisory employees.
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operate to protect a privacy interest in names and addresses. 95 FOIA
provides for release of otherwise exempt information by allowing deletion
of the exempted material and release of the remaining portion. 6 Names
and addresses are sometimes deleted to allow the release of requested
information.97 These provisions, according to the Court, indicate that
disclosure of records regarding private citizens identifiable by name was
not intended by the framers of FOIA.95
That names and addresses may be deleted from a document before it is
released highlights the importance of the context in which disclosure is
made. Only when a court considers the context in which the list contain-
ing the names and addresses was compiled and the grounds for which
disclosure was requested can it properly determine whether disclosure
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.99
Individuals in our society generally have a large measure of control
over the disclosure of their identities and whereabouts."° Private citi-
zens have the option to rent post office boxes and remove home telephone
numbers from published telephone books. These are strong indicators of
the condition of privacy that an individual may want to protect.' 0'
95. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
109 S. Ct. 1468, 1477-78 (1989) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), 552(b) (1988)).
96. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), 552(b) (1988). Section 552(a)(2) states, in part: "To
the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an
agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion,
statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(1988). Similarly, after specifying situations in which disclosure is exempted, section
552(b) states, "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this
subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
97. A principal sponsor of the 1974 FOIA amendments referred to the possibility of
utilizing the statutory segregation provision of section 552(b) to delete names and identi-
fying characteristics to protect personal privacy. See 120 Cong. Rec. 17,018 (1974)
(statement of Senator Kennedy).
Names and addresses may also be deleted pursuant to FOIA's provision that permits
an agency to delete identifying details to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy. See Reporters Comm., 109 S. Ct. at 1477 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)
(1988)).
98. See Reporters Comm, 109 S. Ct. at 1477.
99. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 876(D.C. Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098). The
D.C. Circuit emphasized:
Every list of names and addresses sought under FOIA is delimited by one or
more defining characteristics, as reflected in the FOIA request itself no one
would request simply all 'names and addresses' in an agency's files, because
without more, those data would not be informative. The extent of any invasion
of privacy that release of the list might occasion thus depends on the nature of
the defining characteristics ....
Id.
100. See Homer, 879 F.2d at 875.
101. See id. at 875; Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526,
529 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502
F.2d 133, 137 n.15 (3d Cir. 1974). But see United States Dep't of the Air Force v.
FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 632 (1988).
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Moreover, it is clear that, in certain situations, people may have a legiti-
mate need to protect their privacy. For example, FBI agents would not
want to reveal their home addresses if their names could be associated
with their occupations.1 "2 Seemingly innocuous lists of names and ad-
dresses may actually reveal other information which an individual may
wish to keep private.0 3 In addition, private citizens may reasonably
want to retain control of information concerning the activities conducted
within their households."m Those who receive entitlements from the
government are potential prey to commercial opportunists, and their pri-
vacy must be protected as well. l0"
The House and Senate Reports clearly indicate that the privacy ex-
emption prevents the disclosure of highly personal or intimate details. 6
As a result, even a disclosure that would serve the public interest would
be exempted when balanced against a strong personal privacy interest. If
disclosure would reveal little information besides the individual's name
and address, the individual may still prefer non-disclosure because of a
desire not to receive communications at home."0 7 Disclosure is not ex-
empted, however, where the somewhat weaker privacy interest in free-
dom from unwanted intrusions is balanced against a public interest in
disclosure of information that would reveal something concerning the
operation of government. "Exemption 6 does not protect against disclo-
sure every incidental invasion of privacy--only such disclosures as con-
stitute 'clearly unwarranted' invasions of personal privacy." ' 8
CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act's privacy exemption requires a bal-
ancing of the public interest in disclosure with the individual's interest of
privacy. When weighing these interests, courts should examine, on the
public side, only the interest in, and impact of, general disclosure. Such a
public interest exists if disclosure reveals something about the operation
of government or assists individuals in dealing with federal agencies.
FOIA's privacy exemption clearly prevents disclosure of personal or inti-
mate details about an individual. Viewed in the context of compilation of
the list of names and addresses, the exemption may also protect against
102. See Dep't of Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d at 232.
103. See Minnis v. United States Dep't of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
104. See Wine Hobby, 502 F.2d at 137.
105. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 878
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1098).
106. See House Report, supra note 13, at 11; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 9.
107. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 1988),
vacated, 109 S. Ct. 831, dismissed as moot, 876 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1989).
108. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 382 (1976).
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invasions of privacy facilitated by disclosure that does not serve the core
purpose of FOIA.
Paul A. Rubin

